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A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION IN MILITARY ACTION OVERSEAS
SARAH HILBERT*
INTRODUCTION
Mary wrote a personal story about her brother, Elijah James
McDonald, on the Burn Pits Action Center website.1 After serving in
Amara, Iraq from June 2008 until June of 2009, Elijah James’s health
began to deteriorate in May of 2010.2 Dental infections turned into skin
infections on the face, which turned into gum infections, facial swelling,
fatigue, bruising, and edema of the neck.3 In August of 2010, Elijah James
was found unresponsive and was rushed to a hospital.4 At the hospital,
multiple hemorrhages were found on his brain and his white blood cell
count was seventy-two times the normal count.5 Elijah James was diag-
nosed with acute leukemia, and he died on August 22, 2010, at the age of
twenty-one.6 Elijah’s story is just one of many that begins with deployment
to Iraq or Afghanistan and comes to an abrupt end with bizarre symptoms
and life-ending illness.7 Another veteran, Bethany Airel Bugay, served six
months in Iraq in 2003 and frequently lit burn pits to dispose of waste.8
Bugay said she does not regret serving her country, but
she is convinced that her exposure to the fumes, which
contained benzene and other cancer-causing chemicals,
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would like to thank her family for supporting her throughout law school—especially Mom,
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1 Personal Stories: Mary, BURN PITS ACTION CENTER (Oct. 22, 2010, 11:24 AM), https://
sites.google.com/site/burnpits/stories/mary.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 BURN PITS ACTION CENTER, supra note 1.
8 Bill Zlatos, Burn Pits’ Role in Troops’ Array of Illnesses Fans Concerns at VA,
TRIBLIVE (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/s_757512.html
#axzz24lJl0K4o.
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caused her cancer. . . . “It took 20 years for the military to
admit that some of the warfare was dangerous to our sol-
diers and they were going to have long consequences years
later,” Bugay said, citing Vietnam War veterans sickened
by the defoliant Agent Orange. “I’m afraid that’s what’s
going to happen to our Iraqi veterans and Afghanistan.
It’ll take them forever to figure out that these (burn pits)
are contributing factors to these illnesses.”9
Since her deployment, Bugay has developed chronic myelomonocytic leu-
kemia, a rare blood cancer.10 Chronic myelomonocytic leukemia is usually
rare in young people: ninety percent of cases are diagnosed in people over
sixty.11 The incidence of any of the chronic leukemias is about one per
100,000 people per year.12 What is causing these veterans to develop rare
cancers and strange symptoms? There is evidence that the use of burn
pits in Iraq and Afghanistan could be the answer.13
Burn pits have been used extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan.14
Disposing of refuse is a logistical difficulty in war zones and many mil-
itary officials claim that open pit burning is the only option; the pits are
often close to soldiers’ living quarters.15 The burn pits are used to get rid
of almost anything in the military area including “. . . [p]lastic tires,
Humvee doors, vehicles, [and] medical waste.”16
The human health problems associated with the use of burn pits
are just being revealed and undoubtedly the environmental effects will
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Leukemia—Chronic Myelomonocytic, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, http://www.cancer
.org/cancer/leukemia-chronicmyelomonocyticcmml/detailedguide/leukemia-chronic
-myelomonocytic-key-statistics (last updated July 25, 2011).
12 Ronald M. Sobecks & Karl Theil, Chronic Leukemias, CLEVELAND CLINIC, http://www
.clevelandclinicmeded.com/medicalpubs/diseasemanagement/hematology-oncology/chronic
-leukemias/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
13 Maria Glod, Alarms Sound over Trash Fires in War Zones of Afghanistan, Iraq, WASH.
POST (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/05
/AR2010080506807.html.
14 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-63, AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: DOD SHOULD
IMPROVE ADHERENCE TO ITS GUIDANCE ON OPEN PIT BURNING AND SOLID WASTE MAN-
AGEMENT (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/htext/d1163.html (“From the start of
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military and its contractors have
burned solid waste every day in open burn pits on or near military bases.”).
15 Glod, supra note 13 (“No trash-removal system existed; incinerators are expensive and
take time to install; and the military lacked the time and space to build landfills on bases.”).
16 Id.
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be just as devastating.17 Burn pits are a prime example of poor environ-
mental protection in the Department of Defense (“DoD”) operations stem-
ming from an inadequate environmental management policy. The harmful
effects of commonplace military practices, such as burn pit waste disposal,
do not seem to square with the DoD position that “America’s national in-
terests are inextricably linked with the quality of the earth’s environment,
and . . . threats to the environmental quality affect broad national economic
and security interests, as well as the health and well-being of individual
citizens.”18 It seems that military efforts and environmental concerns are
always at odds when in reality the two should be considered together.19
The DoD is aware of the global consequences that environmental
degradation can have on health and safety.20 Through piecemeal efforts,
the President, DoD, and Congress have attempted to create environmen-
tal standards for DoD operations.21 While each of these individual efforts
is a step in the right direction, comprehensively, the current environmen-
tal policy for DoD operations overseas is inadequate.
This Note will focus on a legislative solution to the environmental
degradation that occurs because of military action overseas. Executive
orders22 and legal accountability23 of government contractors have been
proposed, but both solutions are inadequate to cause needed changes.
In order to propose a solution to environmental degradation result-
ing from military action, Part I of this Note will examine an example of
the degradation associated with military action overseas from burn pits.
The use and effects of burn pits will be examined from a variety of sources.
It has been suggested that burn pits will be the “new” Agent Orange of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so this Note will next make an analogy
to Agent Orange. The analogy to Agent Orange will show the possible track
that the burn pit problem could take if it is not addressed immediately.
Part II will expand on Part I by examining various parts of the
current environmental protection the DoD engages in. Part II will examine
17 Id.
18 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DEP’T OF ENERGY & DEP’T OF DEF., MEMORANDUM OF UNDER-
STANDING (July 3, 1996), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/envvest_mou.html [herein-
after Memorandum of Understanding].
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Margot Laporte, Being All It Can Be: A Solution to Improve the Department of Defense’s
Overseas Environmental Policy, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 203, 205 (2010).
22 Id. at 205–06.
23 Kate Donovan Kurera, Military Burn Pits in Iraq and Afghanistan: Considerations and
Obstacles for Emerging Litigation, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 288, 288 (2010).
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President Carter’s Executive Order 12,114, which was the initial call to
action for protection of the environment during overseas military action.
This Part will also examine the DoD’s interpretation of President Carter’s
Executive Order through DoD Directive 6050.7. Substantive standards
for DoD military bases will be presented through DoD Instruction 4715.5.
DoD Instruction 4715.8 will be presented to show DoD remediation ac-
tions that apply retroactively to environmental harms. The 2010 Defense
Authorization Act will show legislation, similar to that proposed in this
Note, that attempted to stop the use of burn pits. Finally, federal statutes
will be discussed as they seem like an easy solution to apply to military
action overseas but have high standards to meet in order to be applied
outside the United States.
Part III will discuss the solution proposed by this Note. First, the
Executive Order and legal liability solutions will be examined to show
their inherent flaws and suggest that they will not be effective in solving
the problem. A legislative solution will be proposed and sample language
will be suggested using the 2010 Defense Authorization Act and the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act as baselines. Finally, Part IV will serve
as a call to action that stresses the importance of making changes to mili-
tary regulation of environmental degradation overseas before it is too late.
I. CURRENT PROBLEM
A. Burn Pits
As of 2010, burn pits were the most prevalent waste disposal
method in Iraq and Afghanistan; there were an estimated 251 burn pits
in Afghanistan and twenty-two in Iraq.24 The mere use of burn pits is
harmful enough, but it was discovered that on at least four bases in Iraq
operators were not complying with restrictions on burning of items, such
as plastics, that produce harmful emissions.25 In 2008, a burn pit at Joint
Base Balad, the central logistics hub for United States forces in Iraq, was
consuming 147 tons of waste per day.26 The population at Joint Base Balad
was more than 25,000 in 2007.27 DoD is slowly moving from the use of
24 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14.
25 Id.
26 Kelly Kennedy, Burn Pit at Balad Raises Health Concerns, ARMYTIMES (Oct. 27, 2008,
12:13 PM), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/10/military_burnpit_102708w/ [herein-
after Kennedy, Burn Pit].
27 Id.
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burn pits to the use of solid waste incinerators, but the emissions from
the existing burn pits are already having effects on human health and
the environment.28
The Balad burn pit has burned “Styrofoam, unexploded ordnance,29
petroleum products, plastics, rubber, dining facility trash, paint and sol-
vents, and medical waste, including amputated limbs. . . .”30 Air Force Lt.
Col. Darrin Curtis, a former bioenvironmental flight commander at Balad,
wrote in a memorandum that contaminants from the burn pits that troops
may have been exposed to could include benzene, arsenic, dichlorofluoro-
methane, carbon monoxide, ethylbenzene, formaldehyde, hydrogen cyanide,
nitrogen dioxide, sulfuric acid, and xylene.31
Exposure to these toxins can affect human health and have neg-
ative effects on the “skin, eyes, respiration, kidneys, liver, nervous system,
cardiovascular system, reproductive system, peripheral nervous system,
and gastrointestinal tract.”32
Ethylbenzene and benzene are very toxic for aquatic life and can
shorten lifespans, increase reproductive problems, lower fertility, and
change appearances of aquatic life.33 Benzene can evaporate and con-
tinue to contaminate the air and ground by attaching to rain or snow.34
Formaldehyde has long-term effects on animals and humans such as
cancer and chronic illness.35 When birds were exposed to anywhere from
28 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14.
29 UXO Safety Homepage, DOD ENV’T, SAFETY, AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH NETWORK AND
INFO. EXCH., http://www.denix.osd.mil/uxo/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2012) [hereinafter DENIX]
(“[Unexploded ordnance] results from the military’s use of munitions during live-fire
training or testing. UXO are considered the most dangerous category of military muni-
tions. Although the conditions that define military munitions as UXO are specific, the pub-
lic should consider any munitions . . . it encounters as UXO and as extremely dangerous.”).
See also Kennedy, Burn Pit, supra note 26.
30 Kennedy, Burn Pit, supra note 26.
31 Id. Lt. Col. James Elliot stated that the burn pit at the Joint Base Balad was an “. . .
acute and chronic health hazard to our troops and the local population” while Lt. Col.
Darrin Curtis commented that “[i]t is amazing that the burn pit has been able to operate
without restrictions over the past few years.” Id.
32 Burn Pits, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures
/burnpits/index.asp (last updated June 7, 2012).
33 Benzene: Environmental Effects, DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY, ENV’T, WATER, POPULATION
& COMMUNITIES, http://www.npi.gov.au/substances/benzene/environmental.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2012).
34 Id.
35 Formaldehyde (Methyl Aldehyde): Environmental Effects, DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY,
ENV’T, WATER, POPULATION & COMMUNITIES, http://www.npi.gov.au/substances/formaldehyde
/environmental.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
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0.8 milligrams per kilogram of body weight to 11.1 milligrams per kilogram
of body weight of cyanide, death resulted within 15 to 30 minutes.36 Sulfuric
acid is very harmful to plant life because of its corrosive nature.37 Sulfuric
acid can also burn plants and animals when it mixes with water droplets
in the atmosphere and falls to earth as acid rain.38 Exposing humans and
the environment to such dangerous substances will have effects that the
DoD is familiar with.
B. Analogy to Agent Orange
During the Vietnam War, as part of operation Ranch Hand (1962–
1971), the military used various defoliants to remove tree cover, destroy
crops, and clear areas around bases.39 Agent Orange was one of these
defoliants.40 One of the primary chemicals used in Agent Orange, 2,4,5-T,
was found to contain dioxin, and it was discovered that the chemical could
cause birth defects in lab animals.41 The use of 2,4,5-T stopped, but in the
1970s veterans began to develop rashes, cancers, psychological symptoms,
and birth defects in their children.42 The developing problems led to studies
on the effect of Agent Orange on the exposed veterans.43
In 1979, a class action suit was filed against herbicide manufac-
turers and ended with the establishment of the Agent Orange Settlement
Fund.44 It was not until 1991 that President George H.W. Bush signed
into law H.R. 556, the “Agent Orange Act of 1991.”45 More than twenty
years after the United States sprayed the toxic pesticide, it created leg-
islation to retroactively solve the problems—or rather, to pay for the life-
changing effect it had on veterans.46 The Agent Orange Act of 1991 codified
36 Environmental and Health Effects of Cyanide, INT’L CYANIDE MANAGEMENT INST.,
http://www.cyanidecode.org/cyanide_environmental.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
37 Sulfuric Acid: Environmental Effects, DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY, ENV’T, WATER,
POPULATION & COMMUNITIES, http://www.npi.gov.au/substances/sulfuric-acid/environmental
.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
38 Id.
39 Agent Orange and Cancer, AMERICAN CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/Cancer
/CancerCauses/OtherCarcinogens/IntheWorkplace/agent-orange-and-cancer (last visited
Oct. 26, 2012).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, President Bush Signs Agent Orange Act of 1991, AGENT ORANGE
REV. 1 (April 1991).
46 Id.
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the presumptions for certain diseases associated with exposure, estab-
lished a regulatory mechanism for adding or deleting presumptions, ex-
tended priority medical treatment for Vietnam veterans with conditions
related to Agent Orange, and provided for research.47
The Agent Orange Act of 1991 did nothing for the environment
in Vietnam or the Vietnamese people affected by Agent Orange, but The
Victims of Agent Orange Relief Act of 2011 that was introduced in July
of 2011 would do just that.48 The bill would, among other things, require
the Secretary of State to provide medical care and assistance to descen-
dants of the Vietnam War era.49 The bill has been in the Subcommittee
on Asia and the Pacific since October 25, 2011.50
While the Agent Orange Act of 1991 created presumptions and
medical benefits for United States veterans exposed to Agent Orange, the
United States’ official policy is that there is no conclusive evidence that
the substance created any health problems in the Vietnamese people ex-
posed to it.51 In the late 1990s, a study that tested soil, pond water, fish
and duck tissue, and human blood samples, found dioxin levels that were
thirteen times higher than average in soil and twenty times higher than
average in human fat tissue.52 The former president of the Vietnamese Red
Cross believes the use of Agent Orange was a “war crime.”53 Campaigners
sued the chemical companies that produced Agent Orange but a Federal
District Judge dismissed the case stating that the defoliant did not vio-
late international law at the time.54
Veterans have expressed concern that the burn pits could become
the next Agent Orange.55 The legislation and public outrage over Agent
Orange was predominantly concerned with human health effects,56 but
burn pits will have far reaching effects on not only human health, but
47 Id.
48 Victims of Agent Orange Relief Act of 2011, H.R. 2634, 112th Cong. (2011), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr2634ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr2634ih.pdf.
49 Id.
50 Bill Summary & Status 112th Congress (2011–2012) H.R. 2634, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR02634:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited
Oct. 26, 2012).
51 Martha Ann Overland, Agent Orange Poisons New Generations in Vietnam, TIME (Dec. 19,
2009), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1948084-1,00.html.
52 The Legacy of Agent Orange, BBC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia
-pacific/4494347.stm.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Zlatos, supra note 8.
56 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, supra note 45.
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also on the environment.57 The United States has yet to admit that Agent
Orange caused any problems for the Vietnamese people.58 The Victims
of Agent Orange Relief Act of 2011 could be a step towards justice for
Agent Orange victims in Vietnam—only thirty years later.59
II. CURRENT GOVERNMENT DIRECTION
The current environmental protection plan for military efforts
overseas has allowed burn pits to continue to cause health and environ-
mental problems. Through an Executive Order, President Carter first
emphasized the importance of government actors considering the envi-
ronmental effects of proposed actions,60 but the DoD interpreted the key
parts of the Executive Order61 and created the environmental protection
plan it currently follows. Allowing the DoD to essentially create their own
regulatory regime is contrary to environmental interests and poses a clas-
sic “fox guarding the hen house” problem.
A. Executive Order 12,114
President Carter issued Executive Order 12,114—Environmental
Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions (“Executive Order 12,114”) on
January 4, 1979.62 Executive Order 12,114 required officials of Federal
Agencies to examine environmental effects of proposed actions and con-
sider these effects in making decisions about actions.63 The Executive
Order mandated an information exchange between the Department of
State, the Council on Environmental Quality, and any other interested
agency or nation to provide information to decisionmakers through the
use of environmental impact statements, bilateral or multilateral envi-
ronmental studies, or concise reviews of environmental issues.64
The Executive Order sought to further the goals of the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)65 which required environmental
57 See supra Part I.A.
58 Overland, supra note 51.
59 See AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, supra note 39; H.R. 2634, supra note 48.
60 Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1979), reprinted as 42 U.S.C.S. § 4321 (2000).
61 See DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 6050.7: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ABROAD OF MAJOR
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIONS § 1 (1979).
62 Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 60.
63 Id. § 1.
64 Id. §§ 2.2, 2.4.
65 Id. § 1.
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assessment for governmental actions having environmental effects
within the United States.66 Executive Order 12,114 forced federal agen-
cies to consider the environmental effect of their actions abroad, but it
provided no substantive requirements or procedure for ensuring that
protocol was followed.67
The Executive Order was a start down the long road of a compre-
hensive environmental protection plan for the United States military, yet
it was hardly a binding plan for the military to live by. Because President
Carter’s Executive Order lacked any substantial guidance but still man-
dated the military to consider the environmental effects of proposed actions,
the DoD was left to interpret what the Executive Order required of it.
B. Department of Defense Directive 6050.7
The DoD issued Directive 6050.7 soon after President Carter issued
Executive Order 12,114 to define key terms of Executive Order 12,114
and elaborate as to what the DoD must consider when approving “major
actions.”68 Because Executive Order 12,114 was not specific, the DoD
granted ample discretion to commanders reviewing proposed actions.69
The DoD interpreted “major action” to mean actions “of considerable im-
portance involving substantial expenditures of time, money, and resources,
that affect[ ] the environment on a large geographic scale or has substantial
environmental effects on a more limited geographical area,” and it sought
to establish procedures for review of these actions.70 Beyond establishing
what is meant by “major action,” the DoD does not define any other stan-
dard for determining when an environmental assessment is necessary.
There is no definition of “substantial expenditures” or an elaboration on
the geographic area requirements.71
66 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C §§ 4331, 4333 (2006). “NEPA’s
basic policy is to assure that all branches of government give proper consideration to the
environment prior to undertaking any major federal action that could significantly affect
the environment.” National Environmental Policy Act, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov
/region1/nepa/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). Environmental Assessments and Environ-
mental Impact Statements are required under NEPA for all proposed government actions
with a potential for environmental impacts. Id. The Environment Assessments and Envi-
ronmental Impact Statements assess the impacts and examine alternative courses of
action. Id.
67 Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 60.
68 DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 6050.7, supra note 61, § 3.
69 Id.
70 Id. § 3.5.
71 See id.
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The DoD also defined exceptions. Included in the list of exceptions
are actions taken by the President, actions taken at the direction of the
President or a cabinet officer in the course of armed conflict or when a
national security risk is involved, activities of intelligence components,
actions of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense or the Defense
Security Assistance Agency, and actions relating to nuclear activities and
nuclear material except actions providing to a foreign nation a nuclear
production or utilization facility.72
The DoD’s interpretation of what is required from President Carter’s
Executive Order weighs in the favor of the DoD. The amount of discretion
given to reviewing officers allows an officer to decide that a project does
not require an environmental review simply by finding that it is not a
major action, which, according to DoD’s interpretation of a “major action,”
would be easy for an officer to find.73
C. Department of Defense Instruction 4715.5
Substantive standards for Department of Defense overseas mili-
tary bases are set forth in Instruction 4715.5—Management of Environ-
mental Compliance at Overseas Installations (“Instruction 4715.5”).74
Because Instruction 4715.5 set forth substantive requirements and
excluded “environmental analyses conducted under [Executive Order]
12,114,” the procedural and substantive requirements for DoD’s envi-
ronmental management are wholly separate.75 If a commander satisfies
the substantive standards set forth in Instruction 4715.5, he would not
need to base his conduct on an assessment completed as required by
Executive Order 12,114.76
Under Instruction 4715.5, pollution prevention is the “preferred
means for attaining compliance, where economically advantageous and
consistent with mission requirements.”77 Instruction 4715.5 created the
Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document (“OEBGD”) which
specified minimum standards.78 The military installations overseas are
required to compare the OEBGD and local environmental standards to
72 Id. § E2.3.3.
73 Id. § E1.1.
74 DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 4715.5: MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
AT OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS § 6.2 (1996) [hereinafter Instruction 4715.5].
75 Id. § 2.1.7.
76 Id.
77 Id. § 4.3.
78 Id. § 6.2.1.
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determine the standards that the military will adhere to in a given area.79
The combination of the OEBGD and local rules is known as the Final
Governing Standards (“FGS”).80 It appears that there is substantial con-
trol over military operations; however, Instruction 4715.5 excludes many
parts of daily operations.81
The OEBGD states that “[o]pen burning will not be the regular
method of solid waste disposal.”82 The environmental and health effects
of open burning have been recognized in Army reports which provide that
burn pits should not be used for regular waste disposal.83 Army reports
also conclude that “[t]he use of improper . . . burning methods can lead to
significant environmental exposures to deployed troops.”84 The DoD relied
on the permission to use open burning in “emergency situations until ap-
proved incinerators can be obtained” given in Technical Bulletin MED
593 to operate numerous open-air burn pits in Iraq and Afghanistan and
to transition to solid waste incinerators.85
D. Department of Defense Instruction 4715.8
Department of Defense Instruction 4715.8—Environmental Reme-
diation for DoD Activities Overseas (“DoD Instruction 4715.8”) sets forth
policy for remediation of environmental harms on DoD installations out-
side the United States.86 DoD Instruction 4715.8 does not apply to sub-
stantive requirements set forth in DoD Instruction 4715.5.87 Instruction
4715.8 states that the Head of DoD Components has the responsibility of
remedying “known environmental contamination” according to country-
specific policy.88 The country-specific policy must define the appropriate
level of remediation and establish procedures for determining remedial
79 James E. Landis, The Domestic Implications of Environmental Stewardship at Overseas
Installations: A Look at Domestic Questions Raised by the United States’ Overseas Envi-
ronmental Policies, 49 NAVAL L. REV. 99, 117–18 (2002).
80 DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 4715.5, supra note 74, § 6.3.3.1.
81 Id. § 2.1.
82 DEP’T OF DEF., GUIDE 4715.05-G: OVERSEAS ENVIRONMENTAL BASELINE GUIDANCE
DOCUMENT C7.3.13 (2007).
83 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, TECHNICAL BULLETIN MED. 593: GUIDELINES FOR FIELD
WASTE MANAGEMENT 7 (2006), available at http://armypubs.army.mil/med/dr_pubs/dr_a
/pdf/tbmed593.pdf.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 4715.8: ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION FOR DOD
ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS § 1.1 (1998).
87 See id. § 2.2.1.
88 See id. § 4.2.1.
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measures with the foreign country.89 Procedures set forth for remediation
depend on whether the facility in question is “designated for return.”90 How-
ever, “prompt action” must be taken “to remedy known imminent and sub-
stantial endangerments to human health and safety due to environmental
contamination . . . caused by DoD operations. . .” in both situations.91
The process of moving out of Iraq that began in late 2011 is a prime
example of how environmental remediation operates after a military op-
eration.92 In transitioning out of Iraq, operation locations are required to
meet standards of environmental regulation set out by United States
Forces–Iraq (“USF–I”).93 “The USF–I works to ‘mitigate,’ not ‘remediate’
environmental issues in Iraq,” and the mitigation is not completed in ac-
cordance with United States environmental regulations, mainly because
of practicality and cost.94 The transition out of a country such as Iraq can
be difficult because the military is caught between strict United States
environmental laws and loose Iraqi environmental regulation.95 USF–I
aims to be a good steward of the environment, but there are economic
factors to consider when deciding what level of mitigation is appropriate
in a country with less stringent environmental regulation.96
E. National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2647,
111th Cong. (2010)
Congress requested a report on burn pit operations in war zones
as part of the 2010 Defense Authorization Act.97 The bill as introduced
by Rep. Tim Bishop of New York was much more impressive than the
89 See id. § 4.2.3.1.
90 See id. § 5.1.
91 Id. There are obvious problems with this instruction for environmental remediation. By
requiring action for “known” contamination there is motivation for the military to ignore
many problems or not look into the effects of environmental contamination. Additionally,
in many cases of environmental contamination there is no way to know the source, so by
requiring prompt action only for problems caused by current DoD operation, the military
has an out.
92 Tom Vanden Brook, U.S. Formally Declares End of Iraq War, USA TODAY (Dec. 15,
2011), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/story/2011-12-15/Iraq-war/51945028/1.
93 C. Todd Lopez, Responsible Transition: Coordinated Efforts Ensure Successful Trans-
fer of Property, Facilities, SOLDIERS MAG. (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.army.mil/article
/70055/Responsible_transition__coordinated_efforts_ensure_successful_transfer_of
_property__facilities.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2647, 111th Cong. § 317(b) (2010).
2012] A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 275
legislation that was eventually passed.98 The Defense Authorization Act
banned the use of open-air burn pits during contingency operations “except
in circumstances in which the Secretary determines that no alternative
disposal method is feasible.”99 The Act also set forth the requirements for
reporting reasoning and methodology if it determined that there is no
alternative disposal method.100 If burn pits must be used, the Act also
requires that health and environmental standards for military opera-
tions be followed and assessments on the environmental, health, and op-
erational impacts of the burn pits be performed.101 Additionally, the Act
required the DoD to conduct studies on existing medical surveillance, and
the effects of burning plastics.102 The bill as originally introduced would
have required the identification of all troops who may have been exposed
to the pits and inform them of possible symptoms.103 An identification and
notification provision did not make it into the 2010 Defense Authorization
Act, but Representative Tim Bishop introduced another bill, the Military
Personnel Toxic Exposure Registry Act, which would ensure that those
exposed to burn pits receive medical care by creating a registry and ben-
efits.104 Unfortunately, the Military Personnel Toxic Exposure Registry
Act never became law.105
F. Federal Statutes
Most federal statutes are not applicable to DoD operations because
of the extraterritorial standard established in Foley Brothers v. Filardo.106
In Foley Brothers, the Court faced the issue of whether an employment law
applied to a contract between the United States and a private contractor for
work in a foreign country.107 The Supreme Court of the United States
98 Kelly Kennedy, 2010 Spending Bill Lacks Bite in Curtailing Burn-Pit Ops, ARMYTIMES
(Jan. 18, 2010), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/01/military_burn_pit_congress
_011810w/ [hereinafter Kennedy, 2010 Spending Bill].
99 H.R. 2647, supra note 97.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Kennedy, 2010 Spending Bill, supra note 98.
104 New Bill to Help Troops Exposed to Toxic Burn Pits, DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS
(Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.dav.org/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=230.
105 H.R. 4477 (111th): Military Personnel Toxic Exposure Registry Act, GOVTRACK, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4477 (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
106 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
107 Id. at 282.
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answered the question by examining the legislation using three factors.108
First, “unless a contrary intent appears, [the legislation] is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”109 Second, the
Court examined the legislative history and found that there was nothing
in the legislative history indicating that Congress intended the legislation
to apply extraterritorially.110 Third, the Court found that “[t]he adminis-
trative interpretations of the [law] in its various phases of development
afford no touchstone by which its geographic scope can be determined.”111
In Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., the court reviewed the Re-
search Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and determined that it
did not apply extraterritorially.112 The court considered the legislative his-
tory, structure, and language of RCRA to determine if the statute applied
extraterritorially, but the court did not find convincing evidence to sup-
port the claim.113 If RCRA had been found to have extraterritorial appli-
cability it would have solved many of the issues presented by DoD burn pit
practices overseas because RCRA prohibits open dumping and burning
of solid waste within the United States.114
For a statute similar to RCRA to be applicable to United States
actions outside of the United States, the statute has to overcome the extra-
territorial standard. If Congress wants to overcome that standard, they
need to provide adequate proof that their intent was for the statute to ap-
ply outside the United States.115 The reviewing court will look to legisla-
tive history, wording, and administrative interpretations to determine
Congress’s intent. If the proponent of the legislation can establish evi-
dence that the legislation is intended to extend beyond United States
borders, the statute will be applicable to DoD actions overseas and will
have an effect unlike any other attempt at an environmental manage-
ment plan for military operations outside our borders.
Courts that have affirmed the presumption against extraterri-
toriality that was first established in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co. have based their reasoning on considerations of territorial sov-
ereignty.116 In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian
108 Id. at 281.
109 Id. at 285.
110 Id. at 288.
111 Id. at 287.
112 775 F. Supp. 668, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
113 Id. at 676.
114 Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-7(a) (2011).
115 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
116 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
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American Oil Co., the court reasoned that the presumption was justified
because “[i]t serves to protect against unintended clashes between our
laws and those of other nations. . . .”117
If the current environmental regulations that apply within United
States borders were able to overcome the extraterritorial standard, many
environmental problems associated with overseas military action would
be solved. Legislation that would apply outside the United States would
work proactively to stop environmental harm before it started rather
than retroactively to correct past harms, as was necessary for the prob-
lems associated with Agent Orange.118
III. SOLUTION
A. Executive Orders
It has been suggested that the solution to the inadequate DoD
environmental regulation is an executive order.119 Executive orders have
been proposed because of the power of the executive branch and its abil-
ity to produce change.120 Laporte points to President Carter’s executive
order as a successful way to promote NEPA’s ideals overseas and cites DoD
action prompted by President Carter’s executive order as an indication
that the executive order was successful.121 Although Laporte acknowledges
the downfalls of the DoD’s response to President Carter’s executive order,
she attributes the response to “exemptions or ambiguities in the Order
itself,” rather than the DoD’s response to the Order.122
Executive orders, however, are not the best answer. It is true that
executive orders can affect the extraterritorial application of environ-
mental principles as President Carter’s executive order furthered the
goals of NEPA,123 but this benefit is limited.124 President Carter’s execu-
tive order’s purpose was to further the goals of NEPA,125 but it did not
have the power to override the presumption that NEPA could not apply
extraterritorially.126 The executive order may be able to capture general
117 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
118 See supra Part I.B.
119 Laporte, supra note 21, at 205.
120 See id. at 241.
121 See id. at 208–09, 241.
122 Id. at 239.
123 Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 60.
124 See Laporte, supra note 21, at 239.
125 Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 60.
126 See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
278 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:263
ideals or priorities of the executive, but President Carter’s executive order
illustrated that those ideals and priorities can be implemented very dif-
ferently after the DoD interprets the meaning of the executive order.127
Laporte assumes that the executive branch has the expertise and time to
draft an executive order that has the perfect amount of specificity, flexi-
bility, and practicality,128 but this is not realistic. Creating standards for
the DoD in the way that Laporte describes the ideal executive order129 is
not a job for the executive branch.
B. Legal Accountability
Another suggested strategy to combat the poor environmental
decisions of the DoD is through litigation in the judicial branch.130 The
outcome of the KBR Burn Pit Litigation will determine if legal liability
for DoD contractors is a possible solution to the burn pit problems.131 In the
KBR case, plaintiffs contend that KBR, Inc. and fellow DoD contractors
Kellogg, Brown & Root LLC and Halliburton Co., breached DoD contracts
with guidelines for the management of the burn pits.132 “DoD officials say
[the burned materials] contained items now prohibited pursuant to re-
vised guidelines.”133 These defendants have contracts with DoD to pro-
vide the bulk of contingency base operation services, which include waste
disposal services.134 The plaintiffs, led by Joshua Eller who served as a
computer technician in Iraq, filed suit against the defendants for negli-
gently exposing soldiers, contractor employees, and civilians to dangerous
conditions as a result of the poorly managed waste disposal systems.135
Even if legal accountability proves to be a possibility, it is not the
best solution to the lack of regulation for DoD environmental protection.
There are too many obstacles for plaintiffs trying to bring challenges to
military action such as burn pits in foreign countries.136 Plaintiffs will
have to overcome the “application of the government contractor defense
and other theories of derivative sovereign immunity.”137
127 See supra Part II.B.
128 See Laporte, supra note 21, at 239.
129 Id.
130 See Kurera, supra note 23, at 288.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 289.
133 Id. at 290.
134 Id. at 289.
135 Kurera, supra note 23, at 289.
136 Id. at 298.
137 Id. at 301.
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The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) allows government employ-
ees to sue the government in situations where a private individual would
be liable under state tort law.138 Essentially, this means that if the govern-
ment employee’s injury was caused by the act of another employee of the
government acting within the scope of his employment, and under the
state law where the act occurred a private person acting as the govern-
ment did would be liable to the plaintiff, the government will be liable to
the plaintiff.139 Feres v. United States interpreted the FTCA to mean that
the government is not liable for injuries arising from the course of activ-
ity incident to military service.140 Generally, however, government con-
tractors are excluded from FTCA protection.141
The Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. delineated a test
to determine if a government contractor defense should apply.142 Under
the test, liability is imposed “for design defects in military equipment . . .
[when] (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications;
(2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier
warned the United States about [the] dangers in the use of the equipment
[that were] known to the supplier but not to the United States.”143 As the
litigation progresses and more facts about the relationship between gov-
ernment contractors and the government become clear, it will be more
apparent whether the government contractor defense should apply.
More facts from the Burn Pit Litigation are needed before we will
know if the government contractor defense will apply; however, because
it is a possibility, legal accountability is not the best solution. The relation-
ship between the DoD and the government contractors operating the burn
pits will need to be examined to determine what guidelines, if any, the DoD
approved for contractor operation of burn pits. More information is needed
regarding how the contractors managed the burn pits and how closely
they followed DoD instructions. It will have to be determined whether the
DoD or the contractors were aware of the risks of improperly operating
the burn pits.
Additionally, courts may be reluctant to decide on an issue involv-
ing military action because it could be politically charged. In Baker v.
138 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (2006); HENRY COHEN & VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R95-717, FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 1 (2007).
139 COHEN & BURROWS, supra note 138, at 1.
140 Id. at 4 (citing 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950)).
141 Id. at 1 n. 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671).
142 487 U.S. 500, 501 (1988).
143 Id. at 501. This test was developed for a products liability case but could be applied to
burn pit litigation depending on the level of government knowledge and involvement. See id.
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Carr, the Supreme Court identified factors that determine the presence
of a political question that the Court may not decide.144 Political ques-
tions under Baker usually contain:
[T]extually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judi-
cially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coor-
dinate branches of government; or an unusual need for un-
questioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.145
Baker v. Carr determined that each case must be examined indi-
vidually to decide whether a political question is involved.146 Questions
involving foreign relations are political questions if they are clearly com-
mitted to the executive or legislative branch.147 Military environmental
protection could fall into this category, and if a court determined it to be
a political question, it would not be able to encroach on the power of the
executive or legislative branch.148
The obstacles for plaintiffs attempting to bring a suit against the
DoD or a government contractor due to harms inflicted because of poor
environmental regulation overseas are too numerous and uncertain to be
a reliable solution. Litigation is costly and time-consuming for all parties
and is retroactive rather than proactive. A forward-looking, efficient solu-
tion is needed to close the gap between environmental protection within
our borders and environmental protection in overseas military operations.
C. Legislation
The best solution is for Congress to act by creating legislation that
provides clear responsibility for DoD, reasonable standards, means for
holding DoD accountable, and a proper balance between our interests in
144 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 211 (citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
148 See id.
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national security, efficiency, and environmental protection. The United
States has an environmental protection plan for military action, but it is
not comprehensive and provides numerous loop-holes that allow the DoD
to get around environmental protection.149
The 2010 Defense Authorization Act150 offers a useable baseline
for what the proposed legislation could be modeled after.151 The 2010 De-
fense Authorization Act was tailored specifically to the burn pit problem,152
but this Note suggests that legislation is needed to create a structured
environmental protection regime for all military action. NEPA is also help-
ful for draft legislation as it is a general environmental regulation that
embodies a similar purpose to what this Note suggests for the proposed
legislation153 and was the impetus behind President Carter’s Executive
Order.154 The 2010 Defense Authorization Act and NEPA will be used to
draft the proposed language.
The legislation should be a comprehensive statute that includes
the best aspects of what currently motivates environmental protection
within the DoD and should also incorporate new ideas that will fill in the
current gaps. The new legislation could be called the Military Environ-
mental Policy Act (“MEPA”). The parts of MEPA that will be highlighted
in this Note are the purpose, procedural requirements, substantive re-
quirements, exceptions, and presumptions for burn pit diseases. Sample
language is provided for each highlighted section.
The overreaching theme of MEPA is a balance between environ-
mental protection and national security.155 The purpose of MEPA could
be very similar to the purpose as delineated in NEPA:
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national
[military] policy which will encourage . . . harmony be-
tween man and his environment; to promote efforts which
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man;
149 See supra Part II.
150 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2647, 111th Cong. (2010).
151 See supra Part II.E.
152 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2647, 111th Cong., § 317 (2010).
153 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2006).
154 Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 60.
155 The quote from the Introduction of this Note is a prime example of the “balance” that
is the overarching theme of MEPA. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 18.
“America’s national interests are inextricably linked with the quality of the earth’s envi-
ronment, and . . . threats to [the] environmental quality affect broad national economic
and security interests, as well as the health and well-being of individual citizens. . . .” Id.
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[and to demonstrate the United States’ belief that national
security operations and the natural environment should
be intertwined rather than considered exclusively].156
The proposed language of MEPA is formulated to allow for a sixty
day period during which the military presence is exempt from MEPA.157
If the military action or presence does not extend for more than sixty
days, MEPA will not apply. Once the presence or action passes the sixty
day mark, all military action must comply with MEPA.
One of the flaws in President Carter’s executive order was that it af-
forded DoD too much deference in deciding when an environmental assess-
ment was required. To remedy this issue, the proposed legislation should
provide a workable definition for what types of actions require an environ-
mental assessment. The proposed language provides for a sixty day period
wherein MEPA would not apply. After the sixty day period, all military
action that has an inherent health or environmental concern that would af-
fect more than 100 acres of land,158 a comparable amount of water,159 any
threatened or endangered species, or have a possibility of long-term human
health effects on the native or military community would be subject to the
procedural requirements set forth in the model language. This definition
would differ from the definition that the DoD created in DoD Directive
6050.7 because it would consider the human and environmental factors
rather than economic factors, such as necessary resources and money.160
The first section of MEPA should describe the threshold that mili-
tary action must reach to be subject to MEPA regulation. The threshold
level should be drafted as:
The Congress authorizes and directs that . . . :
(1) [All branches of the military, for actions in all areas out-
side United States borders that have an inherent health or
environmental concern, that would affect more than 100
156 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2006) (The purpose
of NEPA has been altered to serve as the purpose of MEPA. Changes are noted in brackets.).
157 Congress could change this time period after considering the amount of time it takes
to have an effect on the environment of a certain area, the length of the average military
project in an area, and the feasibility of completing the MEPA requirements to prepare
for the project.
158 This is an arbitrary number and should be determined based on scientific data on
effects of land from military action.
159 Similar to the effects on land discussed in note 158, the effect on water should be deter-
mined by scientific data.
160 DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 6050.7, supra note 61, § 1.
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acres of land, a comparable amount of water, any threatened
or endangered species, or have a possibility of long-term
human health effects on the native or military community,
and are associated with a military presence of more than
sixty days, shall. . . .]161
The legislation should emulate the NEPA-basis of President Carter’s
Executive Order162 and should require officials of the DoD, and any other
federal agency that may undertake action outside United States borders,
to examine environmental effects of proposed decisions and determine
whether the action will comply with substantive requirements. Procedural
and substantive requirements will be connected in MEPA. The procedural
requirements of MEPA will be very similar to § 4332 of NEPA with a few
additions.163 Most notably, MEPA will require that the military, like all
domestic agencies of the Federal Government:
[I]nclude in every recommendation or report on proposals
for . . . actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement . . . on[:] (i) the
environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented, [and] (iii) alterna-
tives to the proposed action. . . .164
The procedural requirement of the environmental assessment will
be completed to ensure that the effects of actions remain within stan-
dards which form the substantive portion of MEPA. Under the current in-
structions, procedural and substantive requirements are wholly separate,
and if a commander satisfies the substantive requirements, he would not
be required to base his conduct on an assessment required procedurally.165
The proposed legislation would combine the procedural and substantive
requirements into one process, the entirety of which must be completed
for actions that meet the threshold defined in the legislation. The OEBGD
161 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006) (Section 4332 was
adapted to pertain to military operations rather than all agencies within the Federal
Government. Changes are noted in brackets.).
162 Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 60.
163 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
164 Id. (The proposed language is from NEPA for the sake of a model. Changes to the origi-
nal text are noted in brackets.).
165 See DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 74.
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and FGS166 should continue to be used as part of MEPA’s substantive
requirements. The creation of the OEBGD and FGS as outlined in MEPA
should follow the language from DoD Instruction 4715.5:
The Department of Defense shall establish, maintain, and,
as described in [DoD Instruction 4715.5], comply with the
OEBGD. The OEBGD shall be designed to protect human
health and the environment; shall consider generally ac-
cepted environmental standards applicable to DoD installa-
tions, facilities, and actions in the United States; and shall
incorporate requirements of United States law that have ex-
traterritorial application to the Department of Defense.167
In order for this legislation to be workable there will have to be
exceptions, but they should be less numerous than those the DoD created
in Directive 6050.7.168 MEPA will have to include exceptions for:
(1) Actions taken by or pursuant to the direction of the
President or a cabinet officer when the national security
is threatened,169 (2) Actions taken by the president pursu-
ant to the War Power Resolution,170 (3) Disaster or emer-
gency relief actions,171 and (4) Case-by-case exemptions
shall be allowed if it is determined by the Council for Envi-
ronmental Quality and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
that an exemption is merited.172
166 See supra Part II.C.
167 See DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 74, § 6.2.1 (The proposed language
is from DoD Instruction 4715.5 for the sake of a model. Changes are noted in brackets.).
168 See DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 6050.7, supra note 61, § E2.3.3; supra Part II.B.
169 DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 6050.7, supra note 61, § E2.3.3.1.4.
170 War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541. Because the War Powers Resolution
forbids the military from remaining in a combat zone for more than 60 days without autho-
rization from Congress, if the President has sent the military to a foreign country pur-
suant to his power under the War Powers Resolution and the military stays for less than
60 days, MEPA will not apply.
171 DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 6050.7, supra note 61, § E2.3.3.1.8.
172 DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 6050.7, supra note 61, § E2.3.3.2.1. DoD Directive 6050.7
provides for case-by-case exemptions which may be required, “because emergencies, na-
tional security considerations, exceptional foreign policy requirements, or other special
circumstances preclude or are inconsistent with the preparation of environmental docu-
mentation and the taking of other actions. . . .” Id. In any of those cases, the procedures
stated in DoD Directive 6050.7 for case-by-case exemptions should be followed. Id.
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The purpose of MEPA is to provide an environmental policy for
military actions overseas, but Congress needs to remember that there is
a presumption that legislation is not meant to apply extraterritorially.173
This legislation will be useless if Congress does not provide ample evi-
dence to suggest that it intends for MEPA to apply outside the United
States borders as suggested in Foley Brothers.174
As burn pit exposure is emerging as a large problem for veterans
returning home from tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, the proposed legisla-
tion should also include a section to address this issue in a similar way
that the Agent Orange Act addressed exposure during the Vietnam War.175
Similar to the Agent Orange Act of 1991, the proposed legislation should
create presumptions for certain diseases associated with exposure to burn
pits, allow for Foley Bros. v. Filardo addition or deletion of presumptions,
and extend medical treatment and compensation to those veterans who
have been harmed by the exposure.176 The language for MEPA could be
adapted from the Agent Orange Act of 1991:
Presumptions of service connection for diseases associ-
ated with exposure to certain [fumes from burn pits]; pre-
sumption of exposure for veterans who served in [Iraq and
Afghanistan]
(A) [A] disease specified in paragraph (2) of this section
becoming manifest as specified in that paragraph
in a veteran, who, during active military, naval, or
air service, served in [Iraq or Afghanistan] during
[the time to be determined when burn pits were in
use]; and
(B) [E]ach additional disease that the Secretary [of
Defense] determines in regulations prescribed un-
der this section warrants a presumption of service-
connection by reason of having a positive association
with [exposure to burn pits].177
MEPA should go on to delineate diseases and provide for regulations for
adding additional diseases. The time frame for exposure will need to be
173 See supra Part II.F.
174 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
175 See Agent Orange Act of 1991, 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (2006).
176 Id.
177 Id. (The proposed language is from the Agent Orange Act of 1991 for the sake of a model.
Changes are noted in brackets.).
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determined from facts and scientific studies. Because the purpose of
MEPA is comprehensive and not limited to burn pit problems, the section
on presumptions for diseases associated with burn pit exposure should
also delineate a procedure for creating presumptions for other exposures
during military action. If MEPA proactively delineates ways to deal with
exposure issues, the DoD will not have to deal with returning veterans’
health problems on an individual basis. This solution is more efficient,
forces the DoD to take responsibility for the effect it has had on the lives
of many, and offers the health services that veterans should be entitled to.
Environmental remediation efforts are not the subject of this Note
and it is the hope of the Author that with the proposed legislation envi-
ronmental remediation and mitigation efforts will not have to be as com-
monplace in the future as they are today. MEPA should, theoretically,
include some section on transition out of an area after a military operation
and the responsibilities of DoD in that situation. As noted in Part II.D of
this Note, there are obvious economic concerns when determining the re-
mediation or mitigation required in a country with substantially different
environmental regulations than the United States.178 Despite the eco-
nomic concerns, environmental harms that do not fall within standards
outlined in the rest of MEPA should be dealt with regardless of the foreign
country’s environmental policies. The general mitigation and remediation
policy should be determined on a country-specific basis, as it is currently
under DoD Instruction 4715.8. However, the identification of environ-
mental harm and the process must be more precise than DoD Instruction
4715.8 to avoid many of the issues discussed in Part II.E of this Note.179
IV. CALL TO ACTION
Judicial action through liability for the government and govern-
ment contractors in the courts is not a viable solution for the environmen-
tal degradation and human health problems that result from military
action overseas because the burdens that plaintiffs must overcome are
too heavy to result in consistent decisions, or in any decisions at all.180
Executive action through an executive order would not cause the kind of
change in military behavior that is needed at this point, and Executive
Orders have been ineffective in the past because the DoD was able to
178 See supra Part II.D.
179 DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 4715.8, supra note 86, § 4.2.
180 See supra Part III.
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misconstrue each Order through its own interpretations.181 Legislative
action provides the best option for a long-term solution that will apply to
all military action, will have the intent of many federal statutes that al-
ready apply within United States borders, will hold military leaders
accountable to a rigid set of procedures and standards, and will effectuate
the change our country needs.182
President Obama has stated that the burn pit problems will not
become a second Agent Orange.183 Individual Congress members have
shown concern about the effect that burn pits are having on military
personnel. United States Representative Shelley Berkley of Nevada in-
vited Daniel Meyer, a twenty-seven-year-old disabled veteran to President
Obama’s State of the Union address in early 2012.184 Daniel Meyer slept
across the road from the open-air burn pit at Joint Base Balad in Iraq and
has since developed bronchiolitis obliterans.185 Daniel Meyer,186 Elijah
James McDonald,187 and Bethany Airel Bugay188 are just three of the many
veterans who have been affected by exposure to burn pits. There are nu-
merous other veterans who have died or developed debilitating illnesses
because of their exposure to burn pits.189 The effects of burn pits on human
health are just becoming apparent and the environmental effects will un-
doubtedly surface as well. Harm to our veterans, the natural environ-
ment, and citizens in foreign nations that the United States military
occupies may be avoided by an overhaul of military environmental policy.
If the United States does not want to have another Agent Orange
issue to deal with, legislation needs to be passed as soon as possible. The
government denied the dangers of Agent Orange for nearly twenty years
before passing legislation to solve the problems created by poor practices.190
Legislation needs to be passed now that will proactively address problems
181 See supra Part III.
182 See supra Part III.
183 Leo Shane III, Obama Says Burn Pits Won’t Become Another Agent Orange, STARS &
STRIPES (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.stripes.com/news/obama-says-burn-pits-won-t-become
-another-agent-orange-1.93801.
184 Julie M. McKinnon, Toledo Native Is Invited to State of Union Speech, TOLEDO BLADE
(Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.toledoblade.com/local/2012/01/24/Toledo-native-is-invited-to
-State-of-Union-speech.html.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 BURN PITS ACTION CENTER, supra note 1.
188 Zlatos, supra note 8.
189 BURN PITS ACTION CENTER, supra note 1.
190 Id.
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associated with burn pits and other environmental harms caused by
military action. The DoD must be forced to consider environmental effects.
If the United States addresses environmental effects proactively rather
than retroactively, it will not encounter another Agent Orange issue and
the government can merge its national security, health, and environmental
security interests.
In recent years the United States has placed environmental pro-
tection and improving human health at the top of its list of priorities. We
cannot, however, focus our priorities only within our borders. Our citizens
travel to foreign countries to protect our freedom and our military actions
in foreign countries affect our citizen soldiers as well as the global environ-
ment which knows no territorial boundaries. Our environmental protection
needs to span to all the areas of the world where we act.
